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osting by EAbstract Large scale of watermarking methods is available in the literature. These methods differ
in visibility, capacity, and robustness. In watermarking, the robustness against attacks is the most
challenging issue. The desynchronization attacks are the most serious problems facing the water-
marking process. The traditional correlation methods fail in watermark detection. Until today there
is no widely used algorithm for solving the desynchronization attacks. In this paper, we will intro-
duce a new algorithm for solving the watermark desynchronization attacks. The watermark embed-
ding and detection models are introduced. So, these models are related to the attacker model by
presenting four attacking scenarios. We show the effect of each attack scenario on bit rate, signal
distortion, and robustness. We conclude that, the attacker could not distort a big part of the water-
mark. So, we suggest using a probabilistic embedding model combined with the longest common
substring technique. This combination is efﬁcient in solving the desynchronization attacks. Results
show that, the proposed algorithm is powerful against the attacking scenarios. Moreover, the water-
mark is still be detected even if only 5% of the watermark is recovered.
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lsevier1. Introduction
Digital watermarking systems are presented for copyright pro-
tection of digital media. The watermark is extra information
embedded into digital data. The main requirements of digital
watermarking are; invisibility, robustness, blindness, and
capacity. Moreover, video streaming applications require real
time watermarking. The surviving of watermarks against lossy
compression, such as H.264, is an additional feature [1,2].
These requirements are contradicted. The balancing of these
requirements is determined by user’s application. The water-
mark can encode copyright information or a cryptographic
signature. This information identiﬁes a particular copy of the
source digital media [3,4].
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standards. It is developed to meet the growing needs for higher
compression of moving pictures. The standard is jointly devel-
oped by the ITU-T VCEG and ISO/IEC MPEG. It achieves
higher bit rate and lower distortion ratio compared to
MPEG-2. In this paper, the standard is referred to as H.264.
H.264 uses the context-based adaptive variable length coding
(CAVLC) for entropy coding (VLC coding). CAVLC is only
used for encoding quantized transform coefﬁcients. In H.264,
CAVLC requires less calculation than other VLC domains.
So, CAVLC domain watermarking is more appropriate for
real time purposes [5].
Generally, VLC watermark embedding is carried out by
modifying, or interchanging, the VLC codes. This modiﬁcation
is performed according to the embedded watermark bit. In
watermark detection, the watermark sequence is extracted
based on the received VLC codes. The extracted watermark
is then correlated with the original reference watermark se-
quence. The correlation value is used to make a decision about
watermark existence.
However, the watermarking robustness is limited in VLC
domain. The actual transform coefﬁcients values are ignored
during watermarking process. Any bit change in a VLC code
causes decoding ambiguities. Moreover, the swapping of two
or more VLC codes is possible. This action destroys the water-
mark [1,6]. The most serious attack is the missing of water-
mark synchronization which called the desynchronization
attacks. In these attacks, the attacker tries to change the length
of the extracted watermark sequence. This could be done by
removing, or adding, some parts from, or to, the watermarked
sequence. Generally, the desynchronization attacks are re-
sulted from intentional attacks made by attackers. Moreover,
these attacks could be resulted from signal geometric attacks
such as rotation, translation, scaling, and random bending at-
tacks. Whatever the cause of desynchronization, the correla-
tion formulas cannot be applied for watermark detection.
That is, the sequences lengths of the extracted watermark
and the reference one are not the same.
The watermark robustness problem is a battle between the
embedding side and the attacking side. The watermark cre-
ators embed the watermark. However, the attackers try to re-
move or, at least, corrupt the watermark. An important issue is
that; the attackers wish to corrupt the watermark without
causing high corruption in the original media itself.
There are three possible solution classes to desynchroniza-
tion attacks [7]. The ﬁrst solution is the using of invariant
transform. In this solution, an invariant transform like Fourier
Mellin transform is used. However, this solution suffers from
implementation issues. Moreover, it is vulnerable to cropping
and random bending attacks (RBAs). The second solution is
the template insertion. However, this solution can be tampered
by malicious attacks. The attackers could search for the tem-
plate and remove it. The last solution is the feature based. In
this solution, the watermark is embedded into geometrically
invariant image features such as edges and corners. This can
be done using pattern recognition techniques such as support
vector regression [7], support vector machine [8], and neural
networks [9]. However, the required exhaustive search is a
large problem. Moreover, the watermarking capacity is limited
in this solution. The training process is highly computational
operation. So, these algorithms are not suitable for real time
purposes.In addition to the previous disadvantages of these solution
classes, all of them rely on correlation concepts. So, they all fail
in watermark detection when the pair of sequences differ in
length. So, a new solution is needed to deal with the desyn-
chronization attacks with the property that; the tested se-
quences are not of the same length. So, we suggest using the
longest common substring (LCS) algorithm to solve the prob-
lem. LCS aims to ﬁnd the longest string that is a substring of
two strings. Substrings are consecutive parts of a string. The
LCS of the strings ‘‘ABAB’’, ‘‘BABA’’ is ‘‘BAB’’. In this case,
the LCS length equals 3. The alignment techniques are opti-
mally implemented using dynamic programming algorithms
[10].
In our previous work [11], we proposed a real time water-
marking scheme for H.264. The proposed algorithm models
the distribution of the CAVLC blocks TCNs. The blocks are
modeled according to the geometric distribution. The water-
mark is embedded into selected CAVLC blocks in the video
frame. The choice of these blocks is based on a user deﬁned
threshold T. The value of T is based on the presented model.
The proposed watermarking method has many advantages.
Such advantages include; high embedding capacity, real time
embedding and real time detection. Moreover, the proposed
watermark is blind and invisible. The embedding locations
are hidden from attackers. However, the watermark is not ro-
bust against the desynchronization attacks.
In this paper, we will extend our previous work [11]. Firstly,
the watermark desynchronization problems are addressed. So,
we detail the embedding and the detection models. Then, we
develop the desynchronization attacks models that may be per-
formed at the attacker side. We introduce the modiﬁed embed-
ding and detection algorithm for solving the desynchronization
attacks. The effect of each attack on video quality and robust-
ness is experimentally shown. Finally, the effects of combining
the LCS technique with the probabilistic model are shown.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; Section 2
contains an overview of the previously related schemes. Sec-
tion 3 contains the problem formulation and the developed
models. The details of the modiﬁed algorithm are introduced
and explained in Section 4. Section 5 contains the experimen-
tal results and the discussion. The paper is concluded in Sec-
tion 6.2. Related work
In [12], the authors present the recent basics for image water-
marking. A spread spectrum watermark is embedded. The cor-
relation formula is presented for watermark detection.
However, the correlation formula cannot be applied if the tested
watermarks are not of the same length. In [13], the authors pres-
ent an audio registration method based on dynamic time warp-
ing (DTW) technique. They calculate the distance between the
watermarked audio and the attacked one. The algorithm is
developed to overcome the geometric attacks such as scaling at-
tack. However, DTW suffers from locality in watermark detec-
tion. Moreover, DTW aligns the beginning and ending of the
sequences. This is not appropriate in watermark detection. In
[14], the authors use the edit distance technique for fast video
copy detection. The edit distance is used to measure the distance
between two frame descriptors to detect illegal video coping.
However, the edit distance technique is not always suitable for
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highly increased, then the distance is too large.
In [15], the authors proposed an efﬁcient parallel algorithm
for solving the longest common subsequence problem. This
algorithm is an alternative for the classical dynamic program-
ming techniques. However, the longest common subsequence
is not suitable for efﬁcient watermark detection. It is more suit-
able for DNA comparisons. There are two main differences be-
tween DNA sequence and the watermark sequence. The ﬁrst
difference is the sequence length. The DNA sequence is more
larger than the watermark sequence. The second difference;
the watermark may be attacked. On the contrary, the DNA se-
quence is never be attacked.
In [16], the computation analysis of the longest common
substring (LCS) is outlined. LCS could be computed using
the generalized sufﬁx tree. The length and the starting position
of the LCS could be found in O(n+ m). In the proposed algo-
rithm, we only concern with the common substring length.
3. Problem formulation
In H.264, CAVLC is used to encode the 4 · 4 quantized trans-
form block information. The CAVLC block contains some re-
lated elements. One of these elements is the Total Coefﬁcients
Number (TCN). TCN is the total number of nonzero coefﬁ-
cients in a 4 · 4 quantized block. It is an integer value where
0 6 TCN 6 16.
Let the sequence B1 . . . BN represents all CAVLC blocks in
the frame. The function XBi is deﬁned as the TCN value of a
CAVLC block Bi. In watermark embedding process [11], the
user chooses a subset b of the total blocks B; b  B The car-
dinality of b is n. The blocks subset b will be watermarked. b is
determined by using a user deﬁned threshold T such that;
XðbiÞP T. So, n is only determined by T. The watermark itself
is a discrete, pseudo random, uniformly distributed, sequence.
It is generated by using a speciﬁed seed (key). The binary val-
ued watermark function f assumes values belong to the set
{1, 1}. The watermark values itself are generated according
to a speciﬁed probability. The probability of getting a water-
mark value of 1 is p. In this case, we call this watermark value
as even bit. So, the probability of getting 1 is 1  p. in this
case, we call this watermark bit as odd bit.
3.1. The watermark embedding model
Let us deﬁne two Boolean functions. The ﬁrst function, e(x),
which assumes true value when x is even. The second function,
o¨(x), which assumes true when x is odd. If the TCN of a
CAVLC block is even then, we call this block even block. So,
the odd block is a block whose TCN is odd. For all i,
1 6 i 6 n, the watermark embedding algorithm is described as:
XðbiÞ ¼
XðbiÞ  1; if eðXðbiÞÞ and fðiÞ ¼ 1
XðbiÞ; if eðXðbiÞÞ and fðiÞ ¼ 1
XðbiÞ; if €oðXðbiÞÞ and fðiÞ ¼ 1
XðbiÞ  1; if €oðXðbiÞÞ and fðiÞ ¼ 1
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where XðbiÞ is the watermarked total coefﬁcients number
(TCN) of a block bi. f(i) is the watermarking bit. Note that,
in the ﬁrst and the last cases of Eq. (1), the block’s TCN is
decreased. So, the actual number of the coefﬁcients in theblock must be decreased as well. This action is intended to pre-
serve the block’s consistency. So, one coefﬁcient should be
eliminated from the block. After elimination, the actual total
number of coefﬁcients in the block equals the modiﬁed TCN
value. On the contrary, XðbiÞ is not modiﬁed in the second
and the fourth cases of Eq. (1).
In general, the TCN modiﬁcation decision depends on both
the TCN value and the embedding bit. To conclude the embed-
ding process, a block is enforced to be even block when the
watermarking bit is even. Alternatively, the block is enforced
to be odd block when the watermarking bit is odd.
Let q be deﬁned as the probability of even blocks in the
frame. So, 1  q is the probability of odd blocks in the frame.
In watermarking, the number of the modiﬁed blocks in the
frame, n, is computed as:
n ¼ ðqð1 pÞ þ ð1 qÞpÞn ð2Þ
where p is the probability that the watermarking bit is even.
Moreover, if a block is modiﬁed during the watermarking pro-
cess, then there are resulted distortion and bit saving. Let we
deﬁne the average resulted block’s distortion d and the block’s
average bit saving sˇ. In watermarking, the total resulted distor-
tion in the frame equals nd Additionally, the resulted total bit
saving in the frame equals ns.
3.2. The extraction and detection model
In the detection side, all blocks B are scanned to determine the
watermarked set b. b is determined by using the condition that,
X(bi)P T. In this case, 1 is extracted from an even block. 1
is extracted from an odd block. The process continues for all
watermarked blocks for extracting the watermark sequence.
The correlation is tested between the extracted, possibly at-
tacked, sequence f and the original (reference) watermark se-
quence f. The correlation is applied by using the normalized
dot product:
C ¼ hf;
fi
n  n ;1 6 c 6 1 ð3Þ
The ﬂoat valued c equals 1 when there is no similarity at all
between the two tested sequences. The correlation value equals
1 for perfect similarity between the tested sequences. Gener-
ally, the embedding side wishes that; the correlation value c
is maximized at the watermark detector side. The correlation
formula is a good similarity measure between any two se-
quences when two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst condition;
the tested sequences should have the same length. This condi-
tion is a necessary condition for applying the correlation for-
mula. However, the attackers try to increase, or decrease, the
lengths of the extracted sequence. In this case, the correlation
formula cannot be applied.
The second condition; the tested sequences should be per-
fectly synchronized. Here, the perfect synchronization is de-
scribed as fðiÞ ¼ fðiÞ; 1 6 i 6 n. Clearly, this condition affects
the resulted correlation value. Perfect synchronization gives a
correlation value c= 1. However, as the synchronization is de-
creased, the correlation value is decreased as well. The correla-
tion value equals 1 when the synchronization is entirely
missed. Again, the synchronization condition may be violated
by some watermarking attacks. In this case, the correlation
measure is unbeneﬁcial.
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In watermark attack, some blocks TCNs are modiﬁed. These
TCNs are increased, or decreased, according to the attacking
scenario. In watermarking attacks, if a TCN is decreased, then
the actual coefﬁcients number in this block should be de-
creased as well. Similarly, when a TCN is increased, the actual
coefﬁcients number should be increased as well. These actions
are performed to preserve the block consistency. After any at-
tack, the resulted bit rate is increased or decreased. In all cases,
there is a resulted video distortion. Let s represents the average
block saving if one coefﬁcient is eliminated from the block. So,
if one coefﬁcient is added to the block, then s is negative. Let
Rj be the number of coefﬁcients that are eliminated from the
block Bj. So, the total block saving £j when the block Bj is at-
tacked is computed as:
£j ¼ Rjs ð4Þ
Let N0 represents the number of the attacked blocks in the
frame. The total frame saving, £, is computed as:
£ ¼
XN0
j¼1
£j ð5Þ
If the value of £ is positive, then the overall attacking process is
a bit saving process. Alternatively, if £ is negative, the overall
attacking process is a bit increasing process.
Analogously, the total resulted distortion in the frame
could be computed as:
D ¼
XN0
j¼1
dj ð6Þ
where dj is the resulted distortion when the block Bj is at-
tacked. D is the total resulted distortion in the frame. D is al-
ways a positive value. It is clear that, the total resulted
distortion and bit rate are completely depending on the num-
ber of attacked blocks. Moreover, they are depending on the
number of attacked coefﬁcients in the block. So, the attacker
wants to satisfy two contradicted requirements. The ﬁrst is;
decreasing the resulted distortion. The second is; attacking
more blocks to make the watermark undetectable. So, the
attacker should optimize these two requirements.
At the attacker side, the attacker does not know the user
threshold T. Alternatively, He tries to predict it. If the attacker
fails in the threshold prediction process, then some non water-
marked blocks may be attacked. This action causes more video
distortion without much effect on the watermark itself. The
predicted threshold, PT, is used to perform one of the following
attacking scenarios. These scenarios aim to remove the water-
mark entirely or at least corrupt it. The watermark corruption
increases the difﬁculty of watermark detection. The attacker
tries to minimize the synchronization between the extracted
watermark and the reference one. However, the watermarking
attacks increase the resulted video distortion. So, the attacking
scenarios are discussed and analyzed in terms of watermark
robustness, bit rate, and distortion.
Scenario 1: In this scenario, the attacker aims to eliminate
the watermark entirely. The attacker predicts a threshold
(PT). So, the attacker converts the odd blocks to even blocks
and vice versa. This attack negates the watermark. Watermark
negation is the conversion of the watermark values from 1 to -1
and vice versa. The attacked blocks have the condition that;X(Bi) > PT. This attack may be done by using one of the fol-
lowing two options:
XðbiÞ ¼ XðbiÞ þ 1; XðbiÞ > Pt ð7Þ
XðbiÞ ¼ XðbiÞ  1; XðbiÞ > Pt ð8Þ
where
XðbiÞ is the attacked block’s TCN. In Eqs. (7) and (8),
the average resulted distortion is the same. However, Eq. (7)
is not feasible for attackers since it causes larger bit rate. Alter-
natively, Eq. (8) is the feasible choice for attackers since it de-
creases the resulted bit rate.
Based on the threshold prediction process, the watermark
may be entirely attacked or partially attacked. The successful
prediction of PT causes the correlation value equals 1. How-
ever, unsuccessful threshold prediction increases, or decreases,
the length of the extracted watermark sequence. In this case,
the correlation cannot be applied.
Scenario 2: This scenario aims to decrease the length of the
extracted watermark sequence. So, the correlation cannot be
applied. Here, the attacker tries to preserve the video quality.
The attacker modiﬁes the TCNs of some watermarked blocks.
The TCNs are decreased to values less than T. So, the attacker
removes a subset of watermarked blocks from the water-
marked blocks sequence. In this scenario, if PT is successfully
predicted, then the extracted watermark length is shorter than
the reference one. So, the correlation formula cannot be ap-
plied. Generally, to decrease the effect of this attack, the cho-
sen threshold T should be as small as possible. In this scenario,
attacking more blocks could be easily detected as the resulted
blocks are not geometrically distributed [11].
Scenario 3: As opposite to attacking scenario 2, this sce-
nario aims to increase the length of the extracted watermark
sequence. So, the correlation cannot be applied. The attacker
converts some un watermarked blocks to appear as water-
marked blocks. The attack is carried out by increasing some
TCNs values becoming greater than T.
Scenario 4: In this scenario, we assume the attacker knows
the threshold T. The attacker tries to convert some water-
marked odd blocks to appear as watermarked even blocks
and vice versa. In this case, the lengths of the extracted water-
mark and the reference one are identical. So, the correlation
could be applied. However, the correlation value depends on
the number of the attacked blocks in this case.
In all previous scenarios, the distortion is increased as the
number of attacked blocks is increased. Also, the distortion
is increased if any block’s TCN is highly increased or highly
decreased. So, the attacker could not modify more blocks to
avoid more distortion. Moreover, the attacker could not dis-
tort a big amount of any block.4. The modiﬁed watermarking algorithm
4.1. The embedding and extraction algorithm
We modify our previous scheme [11] to overcome the previ-
ously mentioned watermarking desynchronization problems.
In the modiﬁed algorithm, we combine a probabilistic model
with the longest common substring (LCS) technique. The
probabilistic embedding model is useful for solving the
Efﬁcient watermark detection by using the longest common substring technique 119watermark negation problem. LCS is useful when the extracted
watermark length is increased or decreased by some attacks.
This modiﬁed algorithm still has the previous advantages of
[11]. The block diagram of the modiﬁed algorithm is illustrated
in Fig. 1. Two watermarks are generated w, and its negative w.
The negative of any watermarking bit w(i) is given by
wðiÞ ¼ wðiÞ: The embedding algorithm starts by selecting
one of the two watermarks at random. The selection is done
using a probabilistic system S with a probability
pðwÞ ¼ pðwÞ ¼ 0:5. The two watermarks have the same length.
So, the choice step has no effect on the resulted bit rate and the
resulted watermark visibility. However, the choice step is very
important for avoiding attack effects during watermark
detection.
To clarify the watermark negation, consider the following
watermark sequence:
The watermark sequence
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1W
W
Fiatermar
Negative
atermar
w
~
gure 1k
 
k
Thew
CA
S
block dim
VLC B
TCN
tcn
+
agramlock 
r
of theIts negation is:
The negative watermark sequence
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Next, the embedding blocks are chosen according to a user de-
ﬁned threshold T. All blocks that have TCNP T will be
watermarked. The watermarked blocks r are sent across a
noisy channel. The received, possibly distorted, r may be at-
tacked by some attacking scenario producing r. At the water-
mark detector r is received. The watermark sequence l is
extracted. Then, l is matched with the original (reference)
watermark wm using the LCS technique. If the matching value
is greater than 5%, the watermark is decided as a detected
watermark. If not, the extracted sequence l is negated to form
l. l is matched with the original reference sequence again
using LCS. If LCS gives a matching percentage of 5%, then
the watermark is detected. The negation action is performed
to overcome the effects of converting odd blocks to even
blocks and vice versa.
So, in the modiﬁed algorithm, we do not care about the val-
ues of the watermark itself. We care about the contiguous
parts of the watermarks. The common contiguous string
length is computed between the extracted watermark and the
reference one. Also, the common contiguous string length isTransmis
System
Attack
Scenar
modiﬁcomputed between the extracted watermark and the negation
of the reference watermark. If one of the two lengths is more
than 5% of the reference watermark length, then the water-
mark is detected. This may be clariﬁed as; the embedding algo-
rithm embeds one of two watermarks (a watermark and its
negative). In the detection side, the detector tries to match
the extracted watermark with any one of the two watermarks.
If the negated watermark and the extracted watermark are
matched using LCS, then we could easily conclude that, the
embedded watermark is attacked. This idea is an analogy to
the idea of public and private keys in cryptography systems.
So, the detection algorithm is described as:
Start Algorithm:
w = the reference watermark sequence
w = the negative watermark sequence
e = the extracted watermark sequence
L1 = LCS(w,e)
L2= LCS(w,e)
If L1>= 5% * length(w) or L2 >= 5% * length(w) then
The watermark is exist
else
The watermark is not exist
end if
End Algorithm:sio
io
edThe proposed algorithm is valid for solving the desynchro-
nization problems of all types of digital media (image, audio,
and video). In all media types, the watermark is extracted from
the watermarked media. So, the embedded watermark se-
quence is compared with the detected, possibly attacked, se-
quence using the proposed algorithm. The watermark is still
be detected even if the attacking percentage is 95% of the
watermarking length. Moreover, if the watermark bits are con-
verted from ones to zeros, or vice versa, then the watermark is
still be detected using the probabilistic embedding algorithm.
4.2. Robustness against other attacks
It is important to note that, the embedding and extraction pro-
cesses are carried out in the compressed domain. That is why
the only addressed attack is the desynchronization attacks. To
clarify this issue; the proposed algorithm embeds the watermark
in the CAVLCdomain. Thewatermark is embedded by decreas-
ing TCN. In fact; TCN is a computed value in 4 · 4 blocks. It is
not a real pixel value in the raw video format. When the water-
mark is attacked; attackers have two restrictions during the
attacking process. Firstly, the attacked (modiﬁed) value of then
Longest
Common
Substring
No Yes
wm
l
Watermark 
Detected ?
~
Original 
Watermark
Sequence 
Extraction
embedding and extraction algorithm.
120 T.M. Mohamed et al.TCN should be integer valued. As the TCN is the total number
of coefﬁcients in the block. Secondly, themodiﬁed value of TCN
should be bounded by zero and sixteen. If the attackers ignore
these restrictions, the compressed video will not be correctly de-
coded. The ﬁrst and the second restrictions prohibit attackers
from using other attacks such as additive noise, ﬁltering, geo-
metric, and collusion attacks. That is, these attacks are always
applied to the raw video pixels. It cannot be applied in the com-
pressed domain. Alternatively, the attackers could apply these
attacks to the raw video before starting the coding process. In
this case, the watermark is embedded after applying these at-
tacks. In this case, the watermark is fully detected. So, the pro-
posed system is robust against these attacks by default.
However, the attacker could only modiﬁes the TCN value
within the above two restrictions as we previously shown in
the attacking scenarios. In this case, the synchronization at-
tacks occurred. However, the proposed system is designed to
solve these types of attacks. Moreover, the proposed algorithm
solves the problem of different lengths in watermark detection.
The algorithms in [12,17] and [18] cannot solve the problem.
They are using the correlation concepts. These concepts cannot
be applied when the watermarks have different lengths.
5. Experimental results and discussion
The proposed algorithm is tested using the ofﬁcial H.264 refer-
ence software JM ver. 10 [19]. The default encoding parameters
are used. All tests are performed using three standard, com-
monly used, video sequences: Foreman,Mobile, and Container.
These sequences vary in texture and frequencies. Thewatermark
randomness, uniqueness, and correlation are measured using
Matlab 7.0. The LCS is also implemented using Matlab ver.
7.0.YUVTools software is used for videoplaying andSNRcom-
putation. In this software, any two identical sequences give
PSNR value = 100.
5.1. The experimental results
We begin our experimental results by showing the payload of
the proposed system. In Fig. 2, the watermarking system
capacity is shown by using two tests; Test 1 and Test 2. Test
1 uses a threshold of ﬁve. Test 2 uses a threshold of two. It
is clear that, Test 1 has more capacity than Test 2. That is,
the watermarked blocks when using Test 1 are more than those
blocks when using Test 2. Generally, the capacity of the two
tests depends on the chosen user threshold T and the video 
Total Embedded Bits
0
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1400
Akiyo Carphone container Foreman mobile
Bi
ts
Test1 TEB
Test2 TEB
Figure 2 Bit capacity of the proposed system.sequence itself. In the proposed algorithm, the Akiyo sequence
has the least embedding capacity which equals 139 bits when
using Test 2. Comparing this result to Mobasseri’s [6], our
watermarking system achieves an embedding percentage which
is approximately 24 multiples of Mobasseri’s percentage [11].
To test the algorithm robustness, the randomness quality of
the watermark generator is tested. In this test, 200 random
watermark sequences are generated. Only two sequences of
them have a common seed (seed = 0). The other sequences
are generated from different seeds. Fig. 3 shows the correlation
value between every two watermark sequences pairs. The cor-
relation value equals one when the two watermarks have the
same seed. Otherwise, the correlation values are very small.
Concluding that, the correlation value is not large if the tested
watermarks are generated from different seeds. So, the water-
mark randomness quality is good.
Secondly, we evaluate the LCS capability in watermark
detection. We perform four tests shown in Table 1. For each
test, we perform 100 experiments. In each experiment, two dif-
ferent sequences are generated with the same length. The
watermark length is shown in the second column. The LCS be-
tween the two sequences is computed and registered. The
length of the longest sequence in this register is considered as
the LCS. This length is shown in the third column of Table
1. In the last column, this length is computed as a percentage
relative to the sequence length.
It is clear from Table 1 that, the maximum percentage in the
table equals 0.42. Meaning that; the LCS between any two
different sequences is less than 5% of the sequence length. Dif-
ferent sequences means that, the sequences are generated from
different seeds. To clarify this issue; assume we have two
watermarks generated from any seed. So, one of the two water-
marks is attacked by 95% of its length. In this case, the at-
tacked watermark could be distinguished from other
watermarks by using LCS.
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the effect of scenario 1 on video qual-
ity. In this scenario, the even blocks are converted to odd
blocks and vice versa. To simulate this attack, we use three dif-
ferent threshold values for watermark embedding. The attack
is simulated by decreasing all TCNs in the frame by one. For
block consistency, the last coefﬁcient is eliminated [11]. In
Fig. 4.a, 4.c, and 4.e the watermarked sequences are shown
using three different thresholds. In Fig. 4.b the attacked ver-
sions are shown. From the ﬁgure, we noted that, the foreman
sequence is disﬁgured when attacked by attack sceanrio1. Also,
the container and mobile sequences are highly degraded. In
this case, LCS could not ﬁnd any matching between the refer-
ence watermark and the extracted one. However, in our sys-
tem, the solution is the watermark negation. This negation
step is the removing of scenario 1 effect. In this case, the water-
mark is fully detected.
In Table 2, we extend the simulation of attack scenario 1.
The PSNR values are shown between the watermarked video
sequences and their attacked versions. It is clear that, all re-
sulted PSNR values are very small. The attacked sequences
are highly degraded as previously shown in Fig. 4. However,
the watermark is still be detected by the proposed algorithm.
The results of attack secnario 2 are shown in Table 3. In
this test, an embedding threshold T= 5 is used. The choice
of this threshold value is intended to preserve the original vi-
deo quality [11]. In this scenario, the attacker tries to attack
some watermarked blocks. At the detector, these attacked
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Figure 3 The correlation values of 200 random watermarks.
Table 1 The LCS between watermarks of different random
seeds.
No. of
experiments
Watermark
length
Common substring
length
Length
percentage
100 500 21 0.042
100 1000 25 0.025
100 1500 27 0.018
100 2000 25 0.012
Efﬁcient watermark detection by using the longest common substring technique 121blocks will appear as un watermarked blocks. In fact, the at-
tacker does not know the watermark embedding locations.
Alternatively, he tries to predict these locations by predicting
the threshold. After predicting the threshold PT, the attacker
attacks some blocks. The TCNs of the attacked blocks are con-
verted to PT  1. The attacker chooses the value, PT  1, to
avoid more video degradation.
In Table 3, the ﬁrst column represents the tested sequences.
The second column represents the total number of the water-
marked blocks in each sequence before watermark attacking.
The third column represents the predicted threshold PT. It is
clear that, when the predicted threshold PT= 3, it may has
no effect on the watermark robustness. This case occurs whenFigure 4 The results of aponly the attacked blocks are located between TCN= 3 and
TCN= 5. In this case, the effect is only on the resulted video
quality.
The fourth column represents the number of the attacked
blocks by attack scenario 2. The attack type (partial or full)
is illustrated in the ﬁfth columns. In this column, partial means
that: only some watermarked blocks whose TCN> PT are at-
tacked. However, fullmeans that, all blocks whose TCN> PT
are attacked. The attacking percentage is shown in the sixth
column. The PSNR value between the attacked video and
the original video is shown in the last column.
To clarify the table results; consider the ﬁrst row as an
example. The sequence foreman is watermarked using a thresh-
old T= 5. The total number of watermarked blocks equals
258. At the attacker side, the attacker does not know T. So,
the attacker predicts a threshold PT= 3. In this case, the at-
tacker randomly converts 200 blocks whose TCNs values are
greater than PT (3 in this case) to a new value PT  1 (2 in this
case). The attacked blocks are missed at the watermark detec-
tor. So, this action breaks the watermark synchronization. In
this case, the attacking type is partial, which means that, there
are more possible watermarked blocks to be attacked.
However, the attacker could not attack all these blocks be-
cause attacking more blocks causes a higher video degradation.
The attack percentage in this case equals 0.77. It is computed asplying attack scenario 1.
Table 3 The effect of attack scenario 2.
Video No. of Watermarked
blocks
Predicted
threshold (PT)
No. of attacked
blocks
Attacking
type
Attacking
percentage
PSNR MSE
Forman 258 3 200 Partial 0.77 15.84 1694.65
258 5 196 Full 0.75 24.39 236.64
Mobile 1151 3 1000 Partial 0.86 15.55 1811.68
1151 5 1000 Partial 0.86 16.02 1625.85
Container 350 3 300 Partial 0.85 19.43 741.45
350 5 300 Partial 0.85 21.56 454.03
Table 2 The PSNR values of attack scenario 1.
Forman Mobile Container
T PSNR MSE T PSNR MSE T PSNR MSE
0 19.27 769.27 0 23.84 268.58 0 16.47 1465.82
2 13.55 2871.31 2 13.95 2618.67 2 13.23 3090.87
5 11.17 4966.84 5 12.40 3741.8 5 12.83 3389.07
122 T.M. Mohamed et al.the total number of the attacked blocks relative to the total
number of the watermarked blocks. As indicated in the last col-
umn, the PSNR value between the original watermarked video
and the attacked one equals 15.84. This PSNR value is very
low. It means that, the video sequence is highly attacked.
The maximum PSNR value in the table occurs at the last
row which equals 27.11. In this case, the resulted attacked vi-
deo is also degraded. Although this degradation, the water-
mark is still be detected. The attacking percentage equals
45% in this case, which it is less than 95%. So, according to
the results obtained from Table 1, the watermark is still be
detected.
Table 4 shows the attack results when applying attack sce-
nario 3. In this test, we used T= 5. Again, the attacker does
not know the threshold. The attacker predicts a threshold
PT, and attacks (all or some) non watermarked blocks. These
attacked blocks appear as watermarked blocks at the detector.
This action breaks the watermark synchronization. The length
of the attacked watermark is larger than the length of the ref-
erence one. Again, if PT> T, there is no effect on watermark
synchronization because the watermark length is unchanged.
However, the watermark may be partially distorted. The same
analogy of Table 3 could be applied when addressing Table 4.
It is clear that, when applying this attack, the watermark is still
be detected in all cases. That is, all attacking percentages are
less than 95%.
Table 5 presents the attack results when applying attack
scenario 4. In this test, the used embedding threshold T= 5.
The attack is simulated by attacking some blocks TCNs whoseTable 4 The effect of attack scenario 3.
Video No. of watermarked
blocks
Predicted threshold
(PT)
No. o
block
Forman 258 3 200
258 5 200
Mobile 1151 3 327
1151 5 396
Container 350 3 300
350 5 300TCN values >T. These TCNS are converted from even to odd
and vice versa. Attack scenario 4 does not break the water-
mark synchronization. Alternatively, the attack decreases the
similarity between the watermark sequence and the reference
one. By simulating this attack, the watermark is still be
detected using the LCS algorithm. It is also noted that, the ef-
fect on video degradation is low. All PSNR values are larger
compared to previous mentioned attacks results.
5.2. Discussion
When discussing the previous results we could conclude that,
the most dangerous attack scenario is scenario1 attack. This at-
tack could be efﬁciently avoided by using the proposed prob-
abilistic embedding model. If the detector receives a negated
watermark, then the detector has strong evidence that the
watermark is attacked by using attack scenario 1. We believe
that, the attacker could not really attack the watermark by
using scenario 1. The reason is, the resulted video is highly de-
graded. This degradation is well illustrated in Fig. 4.
In attacks scenario 2 and scenario 3, the attacker should
know the embedding threshold for perfect watermark attack.
The attacker does not know the threshold; alternatively he
tries to predict it. As we conclude from Tables 3 and 4, the lar-
ger the number of the attacked blocks, the larger the resulted
degradation. So, the attacker tries to choose a threshold with
the target that, only fewer blocks are attacked. In this case,
the LCS is an effective method to deal with such attacks.
The algorithm only requires a correct percentage equals 5%.f attacked
s
Attacking
type
Attacking
percentage
PSNR MSE
Partial 0.77 21.54 456.12
Partial 0.77 27.75 109.16
Partial 0.28 19.58 716.28
Partial 0.34 25.00 205.63
Partial 0.85 10.30 6068.49
Partial 0.85 20.89 529.76
Table 5 The effect of attack scenario 4.
Video Total number of blocks No. of attacked blocks PSNR MSE Attacking percentage
Forman 258 200 22.07 403.72 0.77
Mobile 1151 1000 25.61 178.68 0.86
Container 350 300 30.36 59.85 0.85
Efﬁcient watermark detection by using the longest common substring technique 123The simulation results show that, this percentage always causes
higher video degradation. So, the attacker could not attack the
video up to 95%. Moreover, we suggest to choose a threshold
T= 5 in watermark embedding. This threshold makes a good
adjustment for avoiding scenario 2 and scenario 3. Moreover,
this threshold preserves the resulted watermark quality.
The results of attack scenario 4 show that, the attacked
blocks could not affect watermark synchronization. Alterna-
tively, it may decrease the correlation values. In this case, the
watermark is still be detected when using the ordinary correla-
tion. If thewatermark is highly attacked, then the correlation va-
lue is very low. If the attacker tries to attack more blocks, the
resulted video is highly attenuated. If the watermark is entirely
attacked, then LCS value is low. Alternatively, the probabilistic
model is used to solve the problem. The extracted watermark is
negated to restore the original watermark.
Finally, we should note that, the watermarking domain is
H.264 compressed video. The domain is a lossy domain. More-
over, the watermarking process is another loss.When the water-
marked video is attacked, a new resulted loss is presented. This
accumulated loss causes more video degradation.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel scheme for solving the water-
mark desynchronization attack problems. This scheme is valid
for all type of digital media images, audio, and video. We intro-
duced the embedding and extractionmodel followed by address-
ing four attacks scenarios. The traditional correlation fails in
solving these types of attacks. We show that, the attacker could
not attenuate a big part of the watermark. This action causes vi-
deo destruction. Moreover, the attacker does not know the
embedding threshold and the embedding locations. So, a re-
sulted video distortion is introduced when predicting the thresh-
old. The resulting distortion andbit rate dependon the attacking
scenario. The proposed algorithm is designed by mixing a prob-
abilistic embedding model with the longest common substring
algorithm. Results show that, the watermark is still be detected
in all attack scenarios. The detection is occurred even if the
watermark is attenuated up to 95%.Moreover, the probabilistic
model is very usefulwhen thewatermark values are negated. The
proposed scheme could be combinedwith otherwork. This com-
bination achieves additional required watermarking features
such as visibility, bit rate, real time conditions, and high
capacity.
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